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Lecture
The ABM Treaty and the Strategic
Defense Initiative*
Abram Chayest
It now seems clear that the Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI) will be high on the public policy agenda for a considerable
period of time to come. SDI raises fundamental issues of national security policy because it puts in question the basic deterrence doctrine that has governed the United States' strategic
thinking for a quarter of a century. SDI is a central issue in the
arms control talks begun on March 12, 1985, in Geneva between
the United States and the Soviet Union, and is likely to occupy
a prominent position in US-USSR relations for some time to
come. Not incidentally, SDI poses probing questions about the
role and meaning of law and treaties in international affairs.
The objective proclaimed by the President in his Star Wars
speech of March 1983, to which the SDI is ultimately traceable,
was a defensive system that would render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." It is difficult to define what such a system
would consist of. The current program is described as a research
* The second in a series of Dyson Distinguished Lectures was delivered on January
28, 1985. The Dyson Distinguished Lecture Series is made possible by the gift of Charles
H. Dyson through the Dyson Foundation. The purpose of the endowment is to encourage
outstanding scholarly contributions and enrich the academic life of the faculty and
students at the School of Law and Pace University.
t Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Harvard University Law School; A.B.,
Harvard College; LL.B., Harvard Law School.
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and development effort, designed only to explore the potential of
a number of different approaches and highly sophisticated technologies, many of which are not now in existence.
Very general descriptions in official statements project a
"three-layer" system designed to intercept strategic ballistic
missiles in three different phases of their trajectory. In the
boost-phase, interception occurs during the first few minutes after the offensive missile is launched and before it has released its
multiple warheads. Thus, a single interception would destroy a
large number of incoming warheads. Moreover, locating and
tracking the offensive missile is facilitated just after launch because the heat emitted by the rocket motors can be seen by infra-red sensors. Boost-phase interception would have to be accomplished from outer space, because only from such a position
would sensors be able to locate, and interceptors be able to attack the missiles, at such an early stage in their flight. Furthermore, the whole process - detection, identification, tracking,
aiming, and destruction of the incoming missiles - would have
to be compressed into less than ten minutes after the offensive
missiles have been launched.
In the second phase, mid-course interception, the missile
would have released its warheads, which would be travelling separately through outer space on the way to their targets. This is
the longest part of the thirty-minute trajectory. For most of this
time, the missile is exposed to attack only from weapons based
in space, but during the later phases, interception might be accomplished by interceptors launched from the ground. On the
other hand, the numerous warheads plus decoys, none of which
emit very sharp signals, make the mission a very demanding one.
Finally, there is terminal-phase interception occurring after
or just before the warheads reenter the atmosphere in the last
few minutes before they reach their target. Terminal interception might be accomplished by relatively conventional ground
based technology. Of the three phases of interception, it is presumably closest to being ready for deployment.
Official statements have not always been clear or consistent
about the purpose of the SDI system. The President's vision of a
world without nuclear weapons implies that the system would be
deployed as a population defense to render American cities impervious to nuclear attack. To accomplish this goal, the system
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would have to be substantially perfect. Nuclear weapons are so
powerful and so many of them are deployed on both sides that if
even a very small percentage of warheads launched in a mass
attack should penetrate the SDI defense, the death and destruction wrought in the defender's cities would be unthinkable. Because a perfect population defense is such a remote possibility,
more recent administration statements have emphasized the potential of the SDI for developing defensive systems to protect
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) in the
United States, thus making a strike against them more difficult
for the attacking force. In either case, however, a three-layer system is contemplated, including space-based boost-phase
interception.
The SDI does not operate in a legal vacuum. A number of
treaties and agreements regulate national activities in outer
space. As far as strategic defensive systems are concerned, the
most important is the Treaty between the United States and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of AntiBallistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty).' This Treaty, which is
of indefinite duration, was one of the two agreements produced
by the SALT I negotiations, concluded in 1972. It is the only
arms control treaty in full force and effect between the two
countries. It represents a very large part of what we have to
show for four decades of US-USSR arms control negotiations.
The basic premise of the Treaty is that it will be easier to
negotiate reductions in offensive weapons, that the strategic balance will be more stable, and that each side will be more secure
if systems designed to defend against strategic weapons are substantially prohibited. Although it is this idea that is challenged
by the President's SDI proposal, the idea to prohibit defensive
strategic weapons was originally conceived in the United States.
Soviet leaders, at first, took a position similar to that now advanced by the administration's supporters of SDI. At Glassboro,
New Jersey, on his 1968 visit to the United States, Soviet Prime
Minister Kosygin engaged in a heated argument with Secretary
of Defense McNamara on this point, maintaining that weapons
capable of defending against strategic missiles were positively

1. Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, United StatesU.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435, T.I.A.S. No. 7503 [hereinafter cited as ABM Treaty].
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beneficial in that they might reduce the carnage and destruction
of a potential nuclear exchange. Secretary McNamara argued
that defensive systems were destabilizing because they might
undermine the parties' confidence in the reliability of their retaliatory capabilities. But McNamara's arguments fell on deaf ears.
Indeed, it has never been clear whether the Soviets ultimately
adopted McNamara's theory, or whether some other reasons finally induced them to agree to the United States' demand for
simultaneous negotiations on limitation of offensive and defensive weapons in SALT I.
In the end, both sides agreed to the prohibition of substantially all defensive systems. That is the fundamental point of the
ABM Treaty: with one very limited exception, it outlaws ABM
systems. Under article I of the Treaty, "[e]ach party undertakes
not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its
country."'2 That, of course, is exactly what the President says he
wants to do: to provide a fool-proof defense for the United
States' national territory. Thus, the objective of the program as
defined by the President is illegal under the Treaty. This point
has special significance in relation to boost-phase interception.
Whatever its ostensible purpose, that layer of the system is inherently a defense of the national territory, because in the
boost-phase it is impossible to discriminate among the offensive
strategic missiles on the basis of their ultimate targets.
Articles II and V reinforce the breadth and categorical nature of article I. Article II is a definitional article and establishes
the coverage of the Treaty. It states that "[f]or the purposes of
this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory."3 Article V is
cast in equally sweeping terms, stating that "[e]ach party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile
land-based."'4 In this unequivocal language, article V covers all
basing modes (other than fixed land-based), including space,
which is the intended arena for SDI. It covers development and
testing, as well as deployment. And it applies to exotic technol-

2. Id. art. I.
3. Id. art II.
4. Id. art V.
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ogy as well as to technology that was available in 1972, when the
Treaty was concluded. It is a substantially universal prohibition
of the testing, development, and deployment of all ABM
systems.
What, then, is permitted by the ABM Treaty? Article III
authorizes limited deployment originally at two defensive sites,
but now reduced to one, either around the national capital of the
party or centered on an ICBM silo field. The site may contain
only 100 launchers and missiles (single war-head and without capability for rapid-reload) deployed in an area no more than one
hundred fifty kilometers in radius. The number and capacity of
the associated radars are also strictly limited.'
The Soviet Union has exercised its rights under article III,
and has deployed a system (nicknamed the Galosh) around Moscow. The United States began construction of an ABM site
around the ICBM field in North Dakota, but subsequently concluded that it would be ineffective, and has abandoned the
project.
Article VII of the Treaty permits "modernization" 6 of these
article III systems. Thus, development and testing work on fixed
land-based systems is permitted. But under article IV, this activity must be conducted at predesignated test sites, two on a
side, containing no more than fifteen launchers each.7 Within
these limits, testing and development of new technologies is permitted by the Treaty. But before they can be deployed, "specific
limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion ... and agreement" between the parties.'
There is no doubt that these provisions of the Treaty were
intended to mean exactly what they say. Secretary of State Rogers, in presenting the Treaty to the Senate for ratification,
testified:
The treaty provides for other important qualitative limitations. The parties will undertake not to develop, test or deploy
ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based,
space-based or mobile land-based .... Perhaps of even greater

5.
6.
7.
8.

Id. art. III.
Id. art. VII.
Id. art IV.
Id.
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importance as a qualitative limitation is that the parties have
agreed that future exotic types of ABM systems, i.e. systems depending on such devices as lasers, may not be deployed, even in
permitted areas.'
And even the Reagan Administration, in the latest Arms Control
Impact statement issued by the Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA) in 1984, agrees:
The ABM Treaty bans the development, testing, and deployment of all ABM systems and components that are sea-based, airbased, space-based, or mobile land-based. In addition, although
the Treaty allows the development and testing of fixed, landbased ABM systems and components based on other physical
principles (such as lasers or particle beams) . . . the Treaty prohibits the deployment of such fixed, land-based systems and components unless the Parties consult and amend the Treaty.
The ABM Treaty prohibition on development, testing and
deployment of space-based ABM systems, or components for such
systems, applies to directed energy technology (or any other technology) used for this purpose. Thus, when such DE programs
enter the field testing phase they become constrained by these
ABM Treaty obligations.1
In the face of broad and sweeping prohibitions, what are we
to make of the Administration's repeated assertions that SDI activities will not violate the Treaty? For general public consumption, including discussions with European leaders, the formula is
that the present program is a "research" program, and that research is permitted, or at least not prohibited, by the Treaty.
As a statement about the language of the Treaty, that is
undoubtedly correct. But the question is, what is "research"? As
a professional audience will recognize, we have now entered the
realm of lawyer's talk. It is at least possible to raise the question
whether, in the context of the Treaty, an expansive definition of

9. The Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems: Hearings on S.J.
Res. 241 & 242 Before the Comm. on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972)
(statement of William P. Rogers, Secretary of State).
10. COMMS. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE SENATE, 98TH CONG., 1ST SESS., FISCAL YEAR

IMPACT STATEMENTS

1984

ARMS CONTROL

266-67 (Comm. Print 1983) (Su. Doc. No. Y4.F76/1:Ar 5/21/984)

(footnote omitted).
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"research" can be made to cover a twenty-seven billion dollar
program that sets out with the deliberate objective of accomplishing the very thing that is prohibited by the Treaty.
At a more technical level, the negotiating history of the
Treaty gives some guidance on what was meant by "research,"
or at least at what point the prohibited development begins. In a
formal statement on this issue, prepared in response to a question from the Foreign Relations Committee during the hearings
on the Treaty, the State Department said:
It was understood by both sides that the prohibition on "development" applies to activities involved after a component
moves from the laboratory development and testing stage to the
field testing stage, wherever performed. The fact that early stages
of the development process, such as laboratory testing, would
pose problems for verification by national technical means is an
important consideration in reaching this definition."
The reference to "national technical means" of verification is
important. This is the only verification process recognized by the
Treaty. The United States, in particular, was insistent that the
Treaty should not contain obligations the performance of which
could not be verified. Research, therefore, corresponds roughly
to what cannot be observed because it is done in the laboratory.
The obverse is that, at least to a first approximation, if the activity could be observed by reconnaissance satellites it falls
within the meaning of "testing" or "development" under the
Treaty.
Now it is clear that the SDI program is to some extent already out of the laboratory and can be observed by the Soviet's
technical means of verification. Thus, the justification that the
SDI program is "research" permitted under the Treaty is shortlived at best. Consequently, the technical legal defense is now
based primarily on two other areas of ambiguity in the Treaty.
First, the Treaty's prohibitions against testing and development apply to "systems" and "components," so the questions

11. Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems and the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Armed Services, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 377 (1972) (statement of Gerard C. Smith, U.S. Ambassador to SALT delegation) (available on CIS
microfiche: No. S 201-22 (1972)).
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that are being asked are: "What is a 'component'?" and "What
is something less than that?" The second ambiguous area is
dual-purpose technology. Anti-satellite systems (ASAT) and
anti-tactical ballistic missile systems (ATBM) are not, as such,
prohibited by the ABM Treaty because the Treaty is limited to
systems designed to intercept strategic ballistic missiles. But
there is a large overlap in the technologies that could be used for
both ABMs, on the one hand, and ASATs or ATBMs, on the
other. Thus, it might be possible to conduct significant portions
of ABM testing and development under the rubric of these other
two programs. It will be seen that we are now moving from lawyers' talk to tax lawyers' talk.
Let us examine briefly two experiments that have been conducted under the SDI program to see how this type of legal argument works. The first experiment is Talon Gold, a program
that has been abandoned, although follow up work with modified elements is still being contemplated. Talon Gold consisted
of three parts: a land-based laser, a space-based mirror, and a
pointing telescope. In a functioning system, the notion was that
the laser beam would be reflected by the mirror and pointed by
the telescope so as to hit the target. Assuming all the parts
worked as intended (a big if), the only elements missing for a
complete ABM system would be a sensor to locate and track the
target and the necessary computational facilities.
So the question becomes whether the three parts of Talon
Gold, either taken together or separately, are "components" of
an ABM system. The Treaty defines components as "currently
consisting of: (a) ABM interceptor missiles . . . (b) ABM
launchers . . . and (c) ABM radars."1 Elsewhere the language
indicates that the term also includes "components capable of
substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or
ABM radars."'" It seems clear that the parts of Talon Gold are
not missiles, launchers, or radars. And, although they would add
up to a large portion of an ABM system if they could actually be
made to work, they do not, in any strict sense, substitute for
missiles, launchers, or radars. With the new technology, the sys-

12. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. II.
13. Agreed Statements Regarding the ABM Treaty, 1(a)[D], 23 U.S.T. 3456, T.I.A.S.
No. 7503 [hereinafter cited as Agreed Statements].
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tern concept is different, and there are no direct analogues to the
components mentioned in the Treaty. Thus, it is argued, Talon
Gold and its parts are not components, and so their testing is
not prohibited under the Treaty.
Consider next the Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE).
This is the much celebrated test in which, as it is said, "a bullet
hit a bullet." The achievement was by no means unprecedented.
It occurred before with comparable fanfare in the late 1960s
when the Defense Department was seeking appropriations for
the since abandoned Safeguard ABM System. Moreover, the experiment had almost no significance for any currently envisioned
operating system. But it has been very important in providing
some public credibility for the SDI in the face of the almost universal skepticism of the scientific community.
In any case, in the experiment, a specially modified Minuteman I missile was launched from the Kwajalein test range (one
of the two approved under the Treaty for the United States) and
intercepted an incoming Minuteman that had been launched
from Vandenberg Air Force Base in California. Article VI of the
Treaty, however, prohibits giving "missiles. . . other than ABM
interceptor missiles . . . capabilities to counter strategic ballistic
missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and . . . test[ing]
them in an ABM mode."' 4 This was an important provision from
the U.S. point of view, designed to prevent the Soviets from
"up-grading" their extensive air-defense system to give it an
ABM capability. Yet it seems difficult to deny that the Minuteman I was, in the language of the Treaty, a missile "other than
an ABM interceptor missile," that it was given "capabilities to
counter strategic ballistic missiles . . . in flight trajectory," and
that it was tested "in an ABM mode."'u The justification given
by the administration is that once the specially adapted Minuteman was used for this purpose, it became an "ABM interceptor
missile," and the test in all other respects complied with the requirements of article VI.
I do not mean to suggest that the United States is alone in
playing these treaty-interpretation games. The Soviet Union has
a large research program in ballistic missile defense. The Soviet

14. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. VI(a).
15. Id.
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government does not operate under a requirement of public accountability, so the exact size and scope of their program is not
publicly known. But based on past performance, there is no reason to believe it is any less accomplished or sophisticated than
our own.
Soviet behavior with respect to the Treaty limitations can
be illustrated by the case of the Krasnoyarsk radar, which has
now been formally designated by the Administration as an ABM
Treaty violation. What is being constructed at Krasnoyarsk is a
large phased-array radar. These radars exemplify the difficulties,
under the Treaty, with multiple-purpose technology. They can
be used for ABM battle management, and so were of concern to
the negotiators of the ABM Treaty. But they are also used in
systems for early warning against nuclear attack, for space
tracking, and as national technical means of verification. The
Treaty deals expressly with radars used for early warning and
provides that these cannot be deployed "except at locations
along the periphery of [the] national territory and oriented outward." The reason for the provision is that radars so located
would be properly sited to perform the early warning function
but could not readily be used for ABM battle management, for
example, as part of an ABM system.
Krasnoyarsk is in the middle of Siberia, more than 700 kilometers from the nearest border, and the radar is pointed across
Siberia to the east toward Alaska, rather than directly outward
over the nearest border, which is with Mongolia, to the south.
According to American experts, both pro- and anti-SDI, it seems
to be ideally situated to fill a gap in the Soviet early warning
system, and its technical features are well-designed for that purpose. Of course, it also has ABM battle-management capability,
and a number of experts think it is well-sited for this purpose.
However, the restrictions of article VI do not apply to radars
"for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as
national technical means of verification. 1 7 The Soviets blandly
maintain that Krasnoyarsk is intended for space tracking, and
that the United States will see that this is so once the radar is
completed. Recent reports from Great Britain suggest that there

16. Id. art. VI(b)'.
17. Agreed Statements, supra note 13, 1(a)[F].
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may be some truth in this explanation. Even if this turned out
to be true, however, the radar would still have ABM battle management capabilities.
Tax lawyers, of course, operate with the Internal Revenue
Service looking over their shoulder, and behind that, the courts,
and behind the courts, the Congress. So there are limits to how
far they can stretch the language of the tax code to create loopholes for their clients. No such constraints operate on the American and Russian lawyers charged with interpreting the ABM
Treaty. Due to this process, pursued by both countries, we are
witnessing the shredding of the Treaty.
The fundamental assurance that the parties were seeking in
entering into the Treaty was the assurance that the other side
was not planning an ABM system - not putting itself in a position where it could break out, that is, abrogate or withdraw
from the Treaty and quickly deploy a system. That assurance is
being steadily undermined by increasingly tenuous and casuistic
interpretations of the Treaty, developed by both countries in a
kind of "conscious parallelism."
More important, whatever one thinks of the plausibility of
the arguments discussed in this Article, it is admitted that these
rationalizations will be available for only a very short time. In a
very few years, three or four at most, SDI program activities will
clearly go beyond the Treaty limits. That will happen long
before the availability of adequate knowledge of the technologies
involved, knowledge that is essential to making intelligent deployment decisions. Thus, the proposition that we can learn
enough to decide whether a defensive system is feasible by
means of a research program permitted under the Treaty - no
matter how far that term is stretched - is quite simply false.
What is to be done? The ABM Treaty is clearly and unmistakably at risk. But the Treaty is not holy writ. Like other laws,
it can be changed or repealed if the circumstances change or for
other reasons it no longer meets the needs of the community.
So, the United States could withdraw from the Treaty. Article XV provides: "Each Party shall, in exercising its national
sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty [on six
months notice] if it decides that extraordinary events related to
the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme
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interests."1 8 As former Secretary of State Dean Rusk has remarked, it may be hard to characterize the possible emergence
of new defensive technologies as "events related to the subject
matter of the Treaty" that "have jeopardized supreme national
interests." But in any case, neither party shows the slightest indication of wanting to withdraw from the Treaty. Each side has
publicly accused the other in strident tones of fundamental violations of the Treaty. Yet both sides seem to want to maintain
the Treaty's regime. Why? It seems obvious that the political
costs of withdrawal - both at home and in the international
sphere - are simply too high.
A second alternative would be to renegotiate the Treaty.
That seems to be what the Administration is hoping for in the
current arms control negotiations in Geneva. But it is hard to
hold out much hope for such an effort if, as the President insists,
the SDI program goes on, pending the outcome of the talks. In
such circumstances, the delegates at Geneva are negotiating at a
moving target.
The clearest and simplest counter to potential defensive
systems is more offensive missiles to ensure penetration of any
defensive shield that may be developed. Why would either side
accept limitations on its right to deploy offensive missiles while
the other was continuing to work at full blast on ABMs, or during an inevitably lengthy transaction period for the development
of defensive systems if they should prove successful? On the
contrary, until the achievement of a fully effective defensive system (for which there is small ground to hope), it would behoove
each side to maintain and expand its offensive arsenals.
Moreover, to negotiate an agreed level of testing, development, and deployment of ABM systems is to accept an agreed
level of breakout capability for the other side. How much of
"breakout capability" will either party be willing to live with? In
the- past, the answer, at least for the United States, has been
substantially zero. As already noted, the United States insisted
on the inclusion of article VI in the Treaty to prevent any possibility of breakout. And over the past fifteen years, it has equally
insisted on the strictest enforcement of those provisions. The
only reason for a change in that attitude would be the hope that,
18. ABM Treaty, supra note 1, art. XV 2.
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if the limitations on testing and development of ABM systems
were relaxed, the United States could exploit a technological
lead over the Soviet Union. Such hopes have proved disastrous
before. The Soviet Union has invariably matched United States'
technological achievements in the field of strategic weapons,
often, as in the case of the MIRV, to the ultimate disadvantage
of the United States. There is no reason to suppose that this
pattern will not be repeated as to ABM weapons.
ABM research programs contain a further threat to successful negotiations at Geneva. If the programs continue, they are
bound to generate numerous activities, like Talon Gold, HOE,
and Krasnoyarsk, of doubtful validity under the existing Treaty.
These will necessarily become matters of contention in the ongoing talks. The ensuing charges and countercharges will inevitably poison the negotiating atmosphere.
If withdrawal and renegotiation are both precluded, what is
left? My proposal would be to terminate the SDI program as
such, at least while the Geneva talks are continuing. To maintain an enterprise with the fiscal and bureaucratic resources of
SDI, with a policy of building, if at all possible, a system forbidden by the Treaty, does not in my view amount to the conscientious fulfillment of treaty obligations. ABM research could continue, but on a scale that is clearly within the range of activities
permitted by the Treaty. Otherwise, I believe, in the process of
trying to negotiate a new Treaty, we will destroy the Treaty we
have.
If that should happen, it would be a fatal blow to the arms
control process that has been going forward more or less continuously since 1945. The prospect for future agreement depends
on the parties' sense that, if a treaty is finally agreed to, they
can rely on it to safeguard the fundamental interests they were
trying to protect through negotiated agreements. If the most important of the arms control agreements collapses, it will be impossible to sustain that sense on either side; and, in this country,
it will be even harder than it is now to mobilize public support
for approval of any agreement.
The consequence would be an unconstrained arms race in
both offensive and defensive weapons, in an atmosphere of intensifying confrontation. That, I believe, would be the most dan-
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gerous situation we have faced in the four decades since the invention of nuclear weapons.
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